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“RUBBER WILL NOT KEEP IN THIS COUNTRY”: FAILED DEVELOPMENT IN BENIN, 1897-1921 
 
JAMES FENSKE1 
 
ABSTRACT. Although Nigeria's Benin region was a major rubber producer in 1960, the industry 
developed slowly. The colonial government encouraged rubber production from 1897 until 
1921, when it abandoned the industry. I explain why rubber did not take hold in this period. 
The government was unable to protect Benin's rubber forests from over-exploitation. 
Expatriate firms were reticent to invest in plantations, and private African plantations 
remained small to 1921. The colonial government promoted the development of “communal” 
plantations, but these suffered from labour scarcity, a weak state, limited information, and 
global competition. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, I explain why rubber failed to take hold in Benin before 1921, when the 
colonial government stopped encouraging production. This instance is similar to other 
development failures in Africa, and so helps us understand their causes.  Further, the 
slow start for rubber is puzzling when contrasted with the adoption of other cash crops 
in Africa in the early twentieth century. 
Institutions, information, and inequality all figure highly in the uneven success of 
development efforts in Africa. Bad institutions such as insecure land rights can hinder 
the adoption of tree crops (Besley, 1995). Information matters. Learning about a new 
crop takes time (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006; Conley and Udry, 2010). Individuals may 
free-ride on the costly experimentation of others, which slows diffusion (Foster and 
Rosenzweig, 2001). Planners are often prejudiced and misinformed. Colonial projects, 
including the Office du Niger, forestry management in Guinea and Nigeria, the East 
African Groundnuts Scheme, terracing in Kenya and Tanzania, and the Thaba-Tseka 
Project in Lesotho, floundered when officials misunderstood the environment 
(Beusekom, 2002; Bromund, 1997; Fairhead and Leach, 1996; Ferguson, 1990; Maack, 
1996; Mackenzie, 1998; von Hellermann, 2007). Inequality too matters. African 
participation in many colonial industries was compelled through poll taxes, 
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punishment, and the continuation of slavery (e.g. Arrighi, 1970; Isaacman, 1996; Brown, 
2003). I show that institutions, information, and inequality hindered the development 
of rubber in Benin to 1921. 
In 1961, Nigeria was Africa’s largest producer of natural rubber (faostat.fao.org), and 
the bulk of its 57,167 tons exported in 1960 came from the mid-Western region 
(Anschel, 1965). In 1921, however, Nigeria exported only 85 tons. Motivated by low 
producer prices and Britain’s global policy of reducing rubber acreage, the Director of 
Agriculture wrote in that year that his department would cease distributing seeds, since 
it was “not desirable that we should appear to in any way be advocating the planting of 
this product” (Anschel, 1965, p. 51). This contrasts with rubber’s later success and with 
Africans’ rapid adoption of new crops in other cases. New world crops such as maize 
were assimilated quickly (McCann, 2005). Under colonial rule, smallholders eagerly 
planted cocoa in south-western Nigeria and Ghana (Austin, 2005; Berry, 1975), and 
cash crops had to be suppressed in East Africa where African cultivation threatened 
settler interests (Brett, 1973; Mackenzie, 1998). Why was Benin different? 
Neither prices nor government disinterest are explanations. Nominal prices were 
17% higher during the post-war rubber boom (1946-1960) than from 1900 to 1921,2 
but annual physical output was more than 35 times greater.3 Further, production 
steadily rose from 1932 to 1939, when prices averaged only £37 per ton. Before 1921, 
the government encouraged production of both wild and planted rubber. 
I divide my explanation by sector. Wild rubber failed because, after undermining 
Benin’s pre-colonial political structure, the colonial government could not create 
institutions to adequately manage Benin’s wild rubber resources. A regulated common 
property resource became open access, and the region’s Funtumia elastica was over-
exploited. Private plantations of Funtumia and Para struggled because planters faced 
high labour costs and lacked the information needed to have confidence in their future 
profits.4 “Communal” plantations suffered due to labour scarcity, limited state 
resources, difficulties in transmitting skills and information, and low returns. Their 
benefits were unequally distributed. 
This is not a parsimonious list. This is justified, first, because wild rubber, private 
plantations, and communal plantations faced somewhat independent difficulties. 
Further, even the minor problems that occurred are interesting in themselves, and are 
part of history. Finally, as I argue in the appendix, the data do not make it possible to 
credibly calculate the relative importance of any particular difficulty. 
There are three comparisons across space and time that allow me to support my 
explanation. First, I contrast Benin with other parts of Africa. Countries that 
experienced destruction of wild rubber and failure of expatriate plantations faced 
similar difficulties. Second, I contrast Benin with Asia. Many of the problems I identify 
                                                          
2 Anschel (1965) gives price figures that average £153 per ton from 1900 to 1921, and £179 per ton from 
1945 to 1960. 
3 25,884 tons versus 701, on average (Anschel, 1965). 
4 By “plantation,” simply mean a purposefully planted farm of rubber trees. This follows the convention of 
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were surmounted in Malaya and Sumatra. Third, Benin’s later success as a rubber 
producer is partly explained by the removal of these conditions.  
In Section 2, I provide background on rubber, Benin, and my sources. In Section 3, I 
discuss wild rubber. In Section 4, I discuss plantation rubber. In Section 5, I conclude. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND SOURCES 
 
The vulcanization of rubber in 1843 made it useful for hoses, tubing, springs, 
washers, diaphragms, and other industrial applications, spurring demand that was 
accelerated by the later spread of bicycles and automobiles (Harms, 1975). By 1921, 
England imported more than 40,000 tons of rubber annually (Rae, 1938). Before Asian 
supply lowered world prices, Africans exported wild rubber to meet this demand. The 
largest African exporters during this period were Angola, the Congo Free State, the 
French Congo, French Guinea, and the Gold Coast. The humanitarian abuses that 
occurred in the Congo Free State are infamous (Hochschild, 1998). I focus on rubber 
production in the area surrounding the Edo-speaking Kingdom of Benin, centred on the 
Benin District of colonial Nigeria. In 1897, following the massacre of an expeditionary 
party led by Consul-General Phillips, British sacked Benin. 
Though rubber was important to Benin’s late colonial economy, the industry has 
received little historical notice. Anschel (1965) and Blanckenburg (1963) describe the 
industry as it was in 1965. Egboh (1985) briefly outlines the history of rubber in Nigeria 
within a history of Nigerian forestry. Afigbo (1970) describes the regulations on rubber 
tapping as part of Ralph Moor’s development policies. Igbafe (1979) gives a few pages 
to the early industry. Usuanlele (1988, 2003), similarly, gives a few pages to the 
communal plantations. I add to these accounts, using colonial annual reports, records of 
the West African Lands Committee (WALC), and correspondence from the National 
Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK) in Kew and the National Archives of Nigeria in 
Ibadan (NAI). 
 
3. WILD RUBBER 
 
While Europeans stressed humanitarianism and the Oba’s tyranny as motives for 
conquest, Igbafe (1970) shows economic motives were important. Little can be added 
here, except to note that traders and British officials noticed Benin’s untapped rubber 
and hinted that regime change would bring them into production. In an 1892 report, the 
Commissioner of the Niger Coast Protectorate wrote to the Foreign Secretary that 
“[t]here is plenty of rubber in the country, but the natives have a great disinclination to 
start working a new commodity.”5 One trader in 1896 reported that the Oba would not 
allow his own people to collect rubber, and turned back those who sought to open up 
trade (Ofonagoro, 1979, p. 149). Miller’s agent at Ughoton informed the consul in 1896 
that, while there was “plenty” of rubber in the country, he was unable to get a “rubber 
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man” from Cape Coast to collect it, since he would not go far from Ughoton, having been 
twice “maltreated while away in the bush” (Ryder, 1969, p. 277). He added that if 
“Benin was under proper Government and the resources of the country properly 
developed ... the exports would be very great.”6 
In 1896, a Lagos man went to the Oba on the advice of the Commissioner, Moor, “with 
a view to asking the King to start the ‘rubber’ industry, the country abounding in that 
product.” Phillips reported that the man offered presents worth more than £30, but had 
no success. He warned the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies that his 
instructions “to deal with this matter by pacific means have been literally obeyed and 
have failed to produce the results desired.”7 In November 1897, soon after the fall of 
Benin, Moor reported the 25% increase in rubber exports to be “satisfactory,” adding 
“and I anticipate considerable increase in the future as much trouble has been taken to 
open up rubber production...A rich country has been opened up to the influence of 
civilization and trade, containing extensive rubber forests.”8 
In this section, I outline the trade in wild (mostly Funtumia) rubber that followed. I 
argue that the new government could not police over-exploitation of Benin’s rubber 
resources. First, it lacked the resources to adequately police tapping. Second, it 
undermined existing systems of property rights, and was unable to replace them. 
After the conquest, the chiefs Ologbosheri and Abohun launched a guerrilla 
campaign, while the British worked to impose their authority. Amidst this confusion, the 
government struggled to police rubber exploitation by Yoruba and Fante tapping gangs 
and by the Royal Niger Company, who sought to take advantage of the change in regime. 
The British believed these outsiders were aiding Ologbosheri and Abohun. Fosbery 
reported that “undoubtedly all the rubber cutters in that part of the country were in his 
favour, and on the day of the first engagement our men were cursed from the bush by 
Yorubas.”9 Later on, he met a man called Deji, living at Isua. “This man’s residence,” he 
noted, “was undoubtedly the head centre of all the Yoruba rubber cutters in that part of 
the district; both these men were arrested, with several of their followers.”10 
The Royal Niger Company expanded into Benin territory. RNC agents moved into 
subject towns, encouraging them to ignore British officers. Moor reported that, during 
the expedition against Ologbosheri, arms and ammunition had “found their way into the 
disaffected area from the territories of the Royal Niger Company, and were no doubt 
exchanged for the rubber.”11 He believed there was a “a general league between the 
rebels, the local inhabitants, and the Yorubas who were in the territories as traders in 
rubber.”12 While some of this had found its way into Benin City, the majority he believed 
                                                          
6 NAUK, FO 2/102: 24 Nov, 1896: Phillips to Under-Secretary of State; Enc: 9 Nov, 1896: Brownridge to 
Phillips. 
7 NAUK, FO 2/102. 16 Nov, 1896: Phillips to Under-Secretary of State. 
8 Niger Coast Protectorate, Annual Report for 1896-7, p. 10. 
9 Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: Enc 4: Report on Expedition against Ologbosheri 
and Abohun by Fosbery. 
10 Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: Enc 4: Report on Expedition against Ologbosheri 
and Abohun by Fosbery. 
11 Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: #1: May 27, 1899: Moor to Chamberlain. 
12 Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: #1: May 27, 1899: Moor to Chamberlain. 
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had been pushed into RNC territory, and RNC marking had been found on the guerrillas’ 
kegs of powder. Rubber continued to pass into RNC territory after this; the defendants 
in Regina v. Akonweli, Odutala, and Ola13 claimed to be employed by a man named 
Omoli, living in RNC territory, who had sent them to Ipoki to work rubber. 
Intensive tapping by these outsiders raised yields but damaged the trees. In a 
situation that resembled open access, the predictable result was overexploitation. In 
1901, the Resident recalled that it was “deplorable to see what destruction was wrought 
by the foreign element some years ago around Ibewhe. Dead rubber trees can be 
counted by the hundred.”14 Fosberry expressed concern that the Yorubas had killed 
many of the local Funtumia, but also described his hope that the recently enacted 
rubber regulations (described below) would improve matters: 
 
The bush passed through between Iho and Isure, Isua and Ihuekpe has been a 
very rich rubber country, but I regret to say is now full of dead rubber trees. 
... The natives stated they never worked rubber, that it was done entirely by 
the Yorubas. I expounded the rubber regulations on every available 
opportunity, and urged the people to protect the riches of their country. ... 
This rubber has of course been a great source of revenue to Ologbosheri.15 
 
British efforts began with “makeshift” regulations, imposed in 1897 “to stop 
foreigners entering the Benin country for the purpose of working the economic 
products therein.”16 Afigbo (1970) has outlined these. Non-Edo were required to obtain 
licenses from the Resident every 6 months for 10s. The regulations prohibited all 
persons from “tapping rubber trees in such a manner as to permanently damage them 
or to interfere with their future yield.” The “Chiefs of the districts” were made 
responsible for supervising adherence, and were to be awarded half penalties after 
convictions. The colonial office was unsure whether these regulations were legal; one 
margin note (signed HBL on April 10, 1899) read, “I do not quite see how these 
regulations have the force of law. They appear to be Queen’s Regulations made without 
the Queen’s consent.” Another note (signed by RW, on May 6) pointed out that it was 
unclear if Queen’s Regulations made under the Africa Order in Council 1889 could be 
enforced against Lagos persons. These worries did not prevent Fosbery from promoting 
the regulations during his operations against Ologbosheri. 
According to Igbafe (1979, p. 340-342), rubber inspectors went out to explain these 
regulations. Forestry Inspectors trained local youth in tapping, who were given licenses 
and would then pass their knowledge on. Influential men were appointed to assist the 
chiefs in policing violations. Later, a 20% tax was imposed on rubber worked by 
                                                          
13 NAI, Ben. Prof. 8/2/1, Case Book 1898-1899. 
14 NAUK, CO 520/7, 26/2/1901: Resident Benin City to Moor. 
15 Benin Territories Expedition Correspondence 1899: Enc 4: Report on Expedition against Ologbosheri 
and Abohun by Fosbery. 
16 NAUK, CO 444/1, 5 March, 1899: Moor to Under-Secretary of State. “Margin notes” are also cited from 
here. 
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foreigners, split between “owners of the land” and the government. License holders 
were required to plant rubber seeds. 
Prosecutions under these regulations tell us about the tappers who moved into 
Benin, and the difficulty of enforcement.17 First, enforcement required policing by 
colonial staff such as forest guards. Second, these officials required cooperation from 
local communities. Third, tappers operated in gangs; if a few violators were caught, 
many would escape. Finally, the court was eager to use punitive sanctions. 
Active monitoring required colonial staff. The defendant in Regina v. Olowo had been 
trained by the Government rubber inspector. He and four others sent out six months 
earlier had not been seen since. He was arrested with three others in Owedou, but three 
of his accomplices escaped. He and his brother worked together, the defendant selling 
his product “for a piece of cloth,” and his brother for 7/6. He was sentenced to one 
month of hard labour. Quality too needed policing. Regulations passed over the 
objections of European traders in 1897 allowed confiscation of adulterated rubber, with 
fines of up to £50 with six months imprisonment (Igbafe, 1979). In Regina v. Osufu Jebu, 
Sumola, and Bakari, the prosecution witness (a Captain) stated that he found Osufu at 
Udo, carrying adulterated rubber towards Lagos. This was produced in court and “found 
to be adulterated and very offensive.” The prisoners claimed they had bought it in Benin 
City and did not know it was adulterated. They were imprisoned with hard labour for 
six months. 
Community cooperation was necessary. The same Captain told the court in Regina v.  
Jegidi and Agbi that, while in the same area, the residents of Obahon informed him that 
the defendants were cutting rubber. They claimed to be from Umapa, but “the natives of 
that village,” told him that they had never seen the men before. The Captain was also the 
prosecution witness in Regina v. Ground Nut, Jack, and Josiah. The defendants in that 
case had been arrested by the headman of Rejain with “a lot of tools etc. used for 
working rubber.” The Captain told the court that he had previously instructed the 
headman to arrest all those cutting rubber without a license. Their sentence was two 
years imprisonment with hard labour. In addition, the court noted that Ground Nut was 
a Mendi (likely Mende, from Sierra Leone) who had deserted government service and 
was charged with raping a small child. 
Monitoring was made more difficult by the size of tapping gangs. The defendant in 
Regina v. Thomas Ouami was charged as the headman of a gang of illicit rubber 
workers. The prosecution witness, T.A. Moses, a rubber inspector, stated that he found 
the prisoner working rubber with a large gang of men under him. On recognizing Moses, 
Ouami ordered his men to escape, begged Moses not to report him to the Consul, and 
offered a bribe. He later sent three men to “beg” Moses not to report him. Ouami’s 
undoing was his claim that he had asked the men to ask Moses to serve as an interpreter 
for him; this contradicted their testimony. The acting resident also considered a prior 
record against the defendant for obtaining money by false pretences as evidence of bad 
character, and sentenced him to 9 months of hard labour. 
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In Regina v. Ipapa, Ehenua, Obasuye, Asaota, and Jegede, the defendants were 
described as “a portion of a gang of 150 who were surprised by the Yorubas of the town 
working rubber near Okiewo.” They were found with rubber just collected in a calabash 
and rubber gouges, and were sentenced to 1 year hard labour each. The defendant in 
Regina v. Jagbohun was charged with not leaving Benin after being found guilty of 
“complicity with illicit rubber workers.” Ten days later, he was brought down from Isua, 
pleading that he was trying to catch illicit rubber workers. The incredulous Acting 
Resident sentenced him to six months hard labour. 
Punishments were harsh. In Regina v. Gbeson and Aburonke, Regina v. Adeanju, and 
Regina v. Lawojo and Omoleye, the defendants were each sentenced to six months or 
one year each for “illicit rubber working” or “working rubber without a license.” By 
contrast, a man who stole a goat from the market to pay a debt of 8s was sentenced to 
14 days hard labour, a man who three times abducted the same female slave of a chief 
was fined £1 and given three dozen lashes, and a man convicted of “resisting the 
government” was given one year of hard labour.18 Notably, there is only one rubber case 
in this book in which the defendant is acquitted.19 
The regulations were soon deemed inadequate (Afigbo, 1970). In October 1898, 
Gallwey reported that Benin was “full of rubber,” but that the Acting Resident had 
“continually been complaining” of the destruction of rubber trees due to “the manner in 
which the natives tapped them.” The number of trees killed amounted to “no small 
figure.”20 In February 1899, Moor stated that it was “utterly impracticable to preserve 
the rubber forests in the Benin City District unless there be a special European officer 
detailed for the work.” Officers had tried to deal with this, but their “enormous amount 
of other work” made it impossible to supervise the Native Inspectors. In his opinion, the 
matter was “pressing”, and “of great importance for the rubber forests in question are of 
very considerable extent and of great value.”21 
In 1899, the regulations were amended. The maximum imprisonment was extended 
to two years, and violators were required to forfeit illicit produce, and a closed season 
was imposed from December to June (Afigbo, 1970). Prosecutions made under these 
also survive. In Regina v. Akinbo, the defendant, charged with “illicit rubber working,” 
pleaded guilty to “working rubber during the close time,” and was sentenced to 6 
months of hard labour. The defendant in Regina v. Aluko was a “foreigner” caught by the 
above Captain working rubber unlawfully at Udo, and found with a large quantity of 
rubber in his house hidden under cinders. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment 
with hard labour. Regina v. Ejei et al saw six men of a larger group arrested. Ejei, their 
leader, had worked under a Fanti headman who had been expelled from the country. 
The defendants claimed to be traders who had ceased working rubber, but were 
sentenced to two years imprisonment with hard labour. 
                                                          
18 Regina v. Peter, Regina v. Bujlu (?) Abudu Ipede, and Regina v. Oriegbe, respectively. 
19 Regina v. Osun and Abiomo; no reason is given for why charges are dismissed. 
20 NAUK, FO 2/185; Oct 26, 1898: Gallwey to Salisbury. 
21 NAUK, FO 2/185; 17 Feb, 1899: Moor to Under-Secretary of State. 
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The Forestry Department was created in 1900, and its chief concern “was the 
preservation of the extensive rubber forests in the Benin territories.” Gallwey credited 
Hitchens, the Forestry Inspector, for the “very energetic manner in which he carried out 
this work, and for the successful efforts he made to educate the Binis to safeguard the 
rubber trees.”22 Hitchens reported that he had inspected and assessed the value of the 
rubber forests belonging to nearly 100 Bini villages, and created “staffs of ex-officio 
rubber inspectors” in each of them.23 He instructed locals in tapping, explained the 
regulations, and “constitute[ed] every Bini an ex-officio policeman to bring to justice 
any rubber gatherer infringing on the regulations.” In his view, the Bini “responded with 
alacrity,” exercising “such restraining influence on prohibited rubber-tapping and 
adulterated rubber-producing that not a single rubber gatherer is free from close 
‘shadowing,’ and not a single ball of rubber and prohibited root rubber could work its 
undetected way to Lagos or our own trading factories.” 1900, the Forestry Proclamation 
was issued; this required licenses from the District Commissioner, detailed permitted 
methods of tapping, and applied to all persons, not only foreigners (Afigbo, 1970, p. 
390) 
At first, these appeared to work. More than £700 was collected as license fees from 
Benin in 1900.24 The Acting High Commissioner noted a fall in rubber exports in 1902, 
arguing timber had attracted “many who formerly collected rubber, and the legislation 
which has stopped the destruction of rubber trees is probably a second cause which 
accounts for the decline.”25 In 1904, Egerton suggested the Forestry Department was 
“fully organized and capable of exercising an efficient control over timber cutting and, in 
a lesser degree, over the proper tapping of rubber-bearing plants.”26 
Thompson wrote in 1906 in glowing terms about the license system, which had: 
 
worked very satisfactorily in the Benin Districts of the Central Province 
where the native communities take a lively interest in forestry matters and 
are fully alive to the importance of preserving the plants – an annual source 
of revenue to themselves.27 
 
He felt the rubber rules were working “very smoothly” in the Central Province, where 
the chiefs had taken “an active interest in protecting their forests, and the inhabitants 
are becoming very law-abiding in this respect.” 1114 licenses were issued, resulting in 
£671 10s paid. 645 of these were given in Benin City. He added a word of caution about 
the “natives”; “as long as they are encouraged by the trade to ruthlessly destroy the 
rubber-yielding plants by getting as much as possible out of them in the shortest 
possible time and then to leave the rest to chance, I am afraid but little attention will be 
paid by them to more prudent advice.” 
                                                          
22 Southern Nigeria Annual Report 1899/00, p. 9. 
23 Southern Nigeria Annual Report 1899/00, p. 9. 
24 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1900, p. 14. 
25 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1902, p. 21. 
26 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1904, p. 4. 
27 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 31. 
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The regulations were, however, ultimately unsuccessful. The Annual Report for 1908 
was gloomy, stating that “[r]ubber appears to be a rapidly decaying business ... the 
Southern production in 1908 was 713,000 lbs. only, as compared with 1,656,000 lbs. in 
1907. Some portion of the shortage may be attributed to the prohibition of tapping in 
certain districts, but the reckless destruction of trees by excessive bleeding is largely 
responsible for the drooping business.” There were only 12 prosecutions and 10 
convictions under the rubber rules. The 1913 report for Benin commented on a falling 
off in rubber exports, blaming this on prices and “the fact that the wild rubber is much 
scarcer than formerly.”28 British regulations had not stopped resource exhaustion. 
Why did thes fail? First, violations were difficult to police. The regulations diverted 
some of the trade from Benin to Lagos as early as 1901.29 Similarly, because Northern 
Nigeria had no similar regulations, rubber was smuggled from to the North (Egboh, 
1985, p. 57). In 1901, a representative of Miller Brothers wrote to Moor, informing him 
of the challenges. “Few of those who bring down rubber,” he argued, were “able to give a 
detailed account of its history from the time of manufacture, as it may have passed 
through many hands before reaching theirs.” Rubber was sold in many markets on its 
way to the coast, and “many of the rubber traders here are preparing to leave the 
district as they profess themselves unable any longer to conduct business here under 
the vexatious conditions in force.” Though every Edo was eligible for a reward of £2 for 
any conviction, the people had not looked after their own interests; “they show 
themselves in that respect unworthy to benefit by the rubber regulations as they have 
already proved themselves in other respects, through not yet devoting the slightest 
attention to the manufacture of rubber.”30 
In 1905, the Governor recognized that prohibitions on root rubber were no longer 
enforced.31 Christy (1911) pointed out that, while 221,566 lbs were exported from 
Southern Nigeria in 1907, only £53/10 was collected in license fees.32 It was impossible 
that 107 license holders could be responsible for this quantity, so the bulk must have 
been illicit. Even if the forestry staff were increased fifty times, he thought it would be 
impossible to police the area: 
 
So long as the native can sell his ‘lump’ rubber at an enormous profit, so long 
will he continue his destructive methods of tapping, and his dirty, primitive 
system of preparation, despite voluminous rules and regulations, which he 
could not understand, even supposing them ever to reach himself or his chief 
(Christy, 1911, p. 13). 
 
Second, the British undermined the systems of property rights that existed before 
1897, and lacked the trust and resources necessary to replace them. Ostrom (1991) 
                                                          
28 NAI, BP 138 1914: Annual Reports Benin Province. 
29 NAUK, CO 520/9. 17 Oct, 1901: Acting High Commissioner to Secretary of State 
30 NAUK, CO 520/9, 13 July, 1901: McLucas and Schaumburg (for Miller Bros and Bey & Zimmer) to Moor 
31 NAUK, CO 520/30, 5March, 1905: Egerton to Lyttelton. 
32 Though this contradicts the figure in the Annual Report, the figure in that report is larger, making the 
argument stronger. 
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argues that effective resource management requires defined boundaries, easy 
identification of those with user rights, rules appropriate to local conditions, 
accountable monitors, graduated sanctions, rapid and low-cost conflict resolution, and 
recognition of users’ rights to devise their own institutions. British conquest weakened 
Benin’s borders, rules were imposed by an external authority without local 
participation, colonial agents lacked accountability, and courts in Benin City were eager 
to impose maximum penalties. 
Before 1897, Edo villages could control access to their forest resources. Outside his 
own village, an Edo need to obtained permission from the local Enogie or Odionwere to 
use the forest, until he settled permanently (Bradbury, 1957, p. 45). Hunters, “native 
and non-native” turned the hand of any animal caught to the Enogie, and the Oba was 
owed a leg and tusk of any elephant killed (Egharevba, 1949, p. 43-44). Non-Edo were 
required to settle and assimilate (Bradbury, 1957, p. 45). After 1897, outsiders came in 
seeking rights to farm, fish, and reap palm fruits, and the colonial government was slow 
to establish effective regulations to control these demands. Yoruba settlers gained land 
without holding title through the Oba; these were not regularized under a Native Court 
Rule until 1914 (Rowling, 1948, p. 11). 
An 1896 editorial in the Lagos Weekly Record asserted Oba’s power make “short 
work” of intruders, wishing that “the greedy rubber hunters” in the Lagos hinterland 
“should one and all be dispatched to the domains of the expeditious King of Benin” 
(quoted by Ofonagoro (1979, p. 120)). This was not speculative talk. Members of the 
British punitive expedition in 1897 found a gang of nine outsiders who had gone to 
Benin to collect rubber. Despite being armed with revolvers, they had been taken 
prisoner and held in Benin for two months, bound so they would hang themselves were 
they to lie down (Ling Roth, 1903, p. 68). Similarly, in February 1897, Moor reported 
that six “Accra men, captured in the Mahin country rubber collecting during the last few 
months, came in from the bush heavily ironed”.33 
The 1908 trade report reached a similar conclusion; the situation was not adequate 
to protect rubber trees from destruction: 
 
[N]ot until rubber trees are owned by individuals, who will see that they are 
duly protected, can this industry be looked upon as a permanent one in 
Nigeria. Thousands of trees in the forests, which are practically a ‘no man’s 
land,’ are destroyed each year by overtapping, and although every effort is 
made by the Forestry Department, with the staff at its command, to regulate 
the gathering and to prevent indiscriminate bleeding, the task in so large a 
country and amidst dense forests is, it must be admitted, and extremely 
difficult one.34 
 
                                                          
33 NAUK, FO 881/7002: Feb 24, 1897: Moor to Salisbury. Presumably, “ironed” means “in irons.” 
34 Quoted in Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908, p. 12 
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The colonial Forest Guards were inadequate and corrupt. In 1899, the defendant in 
Regina v. Amidu35 was charged with seizing a government rubber inspector. The 
inspector came across a “large gang of Lagos rubber cutters.” The prisoner captured the 
inspector and his two carriers, tied them up, and flogged him. The Resident complained 
in 1901 that the “ignorance of some of the native rubber Inspectors may also have had 
something to do with the failure of last year’s sowing... Three of these men have lately 
brought into Benin City seed in a green and half grown condition, absolutely useless and 
of course wasted. One would-be Rubber Inspector was a small boy about 14 who would 
be of about much use as a process server in Ireland of the same age.”36 In 1907, Egerton 
noted their frequent abuses of power (not stating what these were), writing that “there 
are the strongest objections to the multiplication of native Forest guards with semi 
police powers carrying on their work in places far away from European supervision.”37 
The future of rubber was in plantations. The 1904 Annual Report stated there was 
“little doubt that the future supply of rubber largely depends on the cultivation carried 
on during the year by the natives in the Western and Central Divisions.” Similarly, 
Egerton wrote in 1907 that he did not “consider it feasible to efficiently supervise the 
collection of latex from rubber bearing plants in the West African forests.”38 Rather, he 
felt that the colonial office should “recognize that the future of rubber is in the 
cultivated article.” The tone of resignation in this correspondence suggests that the 
British did not abandon regulation of wild rubber production because they knew 
plantations were an alternative, but rather realized that their efforts would not succeed. 
These problems mirrored those of other wild rubber producers in Africa. The worst 
destruction occurred where it was impossible to keep out interlopers. In the Congo, 
concessionary companies were willing to make short-term profits and go bust, giving 
their agents incentives to over-exploit local vines (Harms, 1975). Around Lagos and 
Ibadan, slaughter-tapping may have been introduced by Fante workers imported by the 
governor (Omosini, 1979). In French Guinea, officials worried that “bandit” rubber 
collectors, who roamed the countryside in search of vines, were responsible for 
bleeding them to death (Osborn, 2004), Similarly, locals in the Ivory Coast complained 
that they were unable to prevent itinerant harvesters from extracting as much rubber as 
possible before moving on (Harms, 1975, p. 76). 
Over-tapping also followed the weakening of local states. Dumett (1971) emphasizes 
that the destruction of rubber was less severe in Asante than around Cape Coast. He 
argues this was because producers in the Northern forests could learn from the 
mistakes of earlier tappers. It was also around Kumasi, however, that tappers often 
obtained forest on arrangement from local chiefs, who demanded fees or shares 
(Dumett, 1971, p. 98).39 In Benin, the British exiled the Oba and freed many of slaves on 
whom the chiefs depended (Igbafe, 1975). Other political functions defined in relation 
                                                          
35 NAI, Ben. Prof. 8/2/1, Case Book 1898-1899. 
36 NAUK, CO 520/7, 26/2/1901: Resident Benin City to Moor. 
37 NAUK, CO 520/45: Minute Dated 12 April, 1907 by Egerton. 
38 NAUK, CO 520/45, Enc. 14 April, 1907: Egerton to Elgin. 
39 See also Arhin (1980) and Austin (2005) for rubber in Ashanti. 
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to the king became meaningless. As Bradbury (1973, p. 86) puts it, “British 
administrators at Benin had to construct an administrative bricolage out of their own 
meagre resources of personnel and the fragments of a shattered indigenous polity.” 
This was compounded by Benin’s scarcity of labour. Slaughter tapping may be 
interpreted as another of the labour-saving techniques used throughout Africa (Austin, 
2008). I do not believe this alone explains its pervasiveness. The accounts above suggest 
this was employed by non-Edo, and that Benin had successfully prevented similar 
destruction before 1897, despite high prices. Further, similar environmental 
degradation has followed even in densely-settled areas when states have undermined 
existing institutions – the post-colonial dismantling of common property regimes over 
water and forestry in Tanzania serves as an example (Sheridan, 2004).  
 
4. PLANTATION RUBBER 
 
By 1907, it was obvious that wild rubber had little future. Local Funtumia could be 
planted, and Brazilian Hevea had been introduced to Nigeria in 1895 (Anschel, 1965, p. 
49). By 1921, however, plantations had not transformed Nigeria into the major 
producer it would become after 1945. In this section, I outline the difficulties faced by 
plantations. European private plantations were few, because of labour scarcity, 
government hostility to concessions, and their preference for horizontal over vertical 
integration. African private plantations are of limited visibility in the archival record, 
but also appear to have been small and faced similar challenges securing labour. African 
communal plantations established by the government suffered from labour scarcity, 
limited state resources, difficulty in transferring information, and low returns. 
 
4.1. Private plantations. The most notable attempt by a European firm to plant rubber in 
Benin was that of Miller Brothers. The firm acquired roughly five hundred acres at 
Sapele in 1905, and another 560 in 1911 on the condition it would be planted by 1916.40 
This Para plantation was begun with 10,000 seeds imported from the East; 6,800 
germinated successfully.41 In 1908, the plantation was “doing very well” and showing 
“good growth”; 8,000 plants were 33 months old, and 22,000 plants were 18 months 
old.42 Cowan, the director, testified to the West African Lands Committee (WALC) in 
1913 that the plantation was paying rent to 5 or 6 different local communities. At that 
time, 800 acres were under cultivation and the bulk of the 400 labourers did not come 
from Benin or Sapele, but rather from the Opobo, Kwa, and Ibibio territories (WALC, 
1916, p. 468-475). 
In 1915, a return of agricultural plantations in Benin province listed five – J.G.M 
Cranstoun and Company’s at Sapoba, Messrs. MacIver’s at Sapoba, I.T. Palmer’s at 
                                                          
40 NAI, BP 311/1914: Rubber Plantation on the Ologbo Road, 18 March, 1911: Provincial Commissioner 
Warri to Provincial Commissioner Calabar. 
41 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1905, p. 24. 
42 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908, p. 15. 
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Sapoba and Abraka, and the Nigerian Mahogany and Trading Company’s at Unutu.43 
MacIver and Palmer (an African) were both said to have rubber in good condition at this 
time. Egboh (1985, p. 159) states that Cranstoun had two plantations in 1908, totalling 
1,280 acres. MacIver reported in 1917 that they were doing no business in rubber, 
though their plantation caught the attention of Macmillan (1920, p. 73) and by 1927 
their holdings had expanded to 2021 acres.44 This and Cranstoun’s were later taken 
over by the United Africa Company, becoming the Jamieson Estate Plantation (Pedler, 
1974, p. 246). Miller’s estate at Sapele later became UAC property as well (Fieldhouse, 
1994, p. 204-5). 
Others were less successful. A German firm, possibly Bey and Zimmer, planted ten 
acres that were surrendered during the First World War (Usuanlele, 2003, p. 59). The 
African Association start an experimental Para plantation in 1906 at Warri, but James 
believed that they “[did] not seem to have pushed the matter further.”45 In 1908, they 
had an “excellent small Para rubber plantation at Eket.”46 The British Cotton Growing 
Association started a plantation in Benin territory in 1909, but in 1917 it was 
“neglected,” containing only 228 trees.47 
These plantations had difficulty securing labour. Cowan told the WALC that his 
company did not use Edo labourers because, though they could make arrangements 
with headmen, the people were unwilling and would work for at maximum six months. 
He believed this was because the authority of the Benin chiefs had declined. Labour 
scarcity in Benin was also a result of low population density, exacerbated by competing 
demands from the state for road work and porters, and from timber concessions. 
Similarly, Miller had obtained permission in 1916 to tap 400 Para trees on the Sapoba 
road, at a cost of 1s per tree for a season, but reported to the government that it had 
been unable to tap these because it was difficult to find a European supervisor, children 
and livestock interfered, and there were too few trees to justify smoke and drying 
sheds.48  
In addition, the British were reticent to grant concessions to Europeans for working 
produce that Africans could exploit on their own (as opposed to timber). The African 
Association and Miller were both rejected for concessions in 1898 (Afigbo, 1970, p. 
392). Officials such as Moor and Gallwey opposed these, preferring “development by the 
natives themselves.”49 Evans’ application to rent communal plantations was turned 
down in 1911 (Egboh, 1985, p. 158). By Pedler’s (1974, p. 245-6) account, Miller only 
                                                          
43 NAI, BP 603 1915 Agricultural Plantations Benin Province. Two lists are given in this file; the first omits 
Cranstoun, the second MacIver. 
44 NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division, 16 Nov, 1917: Howe (for MacIver and Co) 
to Acting District Officer. NAI, CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin Division. 
45 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906, p. 38.  
46 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908, p. 15. 
47 NAI, BP 175/1917, Para Rubber Plantations, 19 June, 1917: D.O. Ubiaja to Resident. 
48 NAI, BP 510 1916 Para Trees Benin City Arrangement with Regard to Tapping, 12 Oct 1916: Herald to 
DO Benin City 
49 NAUK, FO 2/179: 28 July, 1898: Gallwey to Under-Secretary of State. See also his letter from 13May, 
1898 
in the same volume. 
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acquired land after Cowan spoke with Egerton, who had come from Malaya and was 
disappointed that merchants Nigeria seemed to be showing no comparable initiative in 
developing rubber. Where other individuals or firms acquired labour, these were also 
exceptions, that “resulted from land transactions carried out by African chiefs before the 
policy of the protectorate government had been well established.” Phillips (1989) 
argues that the British came to favour “peasants” over “plantations” in West Africa 
generally because of opposition from local chiefs, lawyers and concessionary companies 
to the 1897 Gold Coast Lands Bill, pressure from “Third Party” reformers, their inability 
to create a market for labour, resistance from the Aborigines’ Rights Protection Society, 
spurious concessions in the Gold Coast, “mercantile” manufacturers who seemed 
capable of healthy profits without engaging in production, and a desire to limit litigation 
and migration. 
Further, European firms throughout West Africa remained horizontally, as opposed 
to vertically integrated. Usuanlele (1988, p. 248) calls this a preference for “commerce” 
over “production.” Barred from directly engaging in agriculture and faced with a market 
in which export crops were produced by thousands of small, dispersed farmers, large 
trading firms chose to operate in many products and colonies, but to refrain from 
production (Hopkins, 1976). 
The difficulties faced by expatriate rubber planters in Benin echo those of other 
attempts to create rubber plantations in Africa during this period. Three companies 
acquired land to plant rubber in the Gold Coast in 1905-6, but could not compete with 
cocoa farms and gold mines for labour (Munro, 1981, p. 271).  Prospective planters in 
West Africa were aware of their own ignorance, had difficulty maintaining local 
management, lacked financial resources, and found the colonial office unwilling to grant 
them monopolies even to collect wild rubber (Munro, 1981). In East Africa, expatriate 
planters had expected cheap labour, but within months of starting “all were 
complaining loudly and bitterly about their labour difficulties” (Munro, 1983, p. 374). 
These were driven under by Asian competition. Firestone’s success in Liberia came 
later. He was gained concessions from the Liberian government in both land and tariffs 
that firms in British West Africa could not (Finlay, 2009, p. 77).  
Less is knowable about private plantations owned by Africans.50 The Annual Reports 
and Igbafe (1979) take an upbeat view. In 1903, some “more intelligent chiefs” had 
started operations on their own account.51 In 1906, the Provincial Forest Officer stated 
that the “feature of the year ... [had] been the number of small private plantations made 
by individual natives, although it [was] difficult to say exactly how many [had] been 
made.”52 Igbafe (1979, p. 343-348) notes that 126 villages had been convinced to start 
plantations by the end of 1903, there were 369 private plantations by 1906, and that 
some 3,000 acres were owned by eleven private individuals or companies by 1925. The 
                                                          
50 Usuanlele (2003, p. 60) lists Lawani Bokoni, W.A. Sagay, S.D. Garrick, Bello Osagie (a Yoruba, an Itsekiri, 
a Kalabari, and a Benin trader) as having plantations of “various sizes” during this period, though he does 
not specify what they planted. 
51 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1903, p. 19. 
52 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 17. 
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largest of these belonged to Palmer, reported to have 1500 acres at Abraka, employing 
900 labourers who were paid the same wages as in the timber industry (WALC, 1916, p. 
468-475).53 I.T. Palmer held an estate at Sapele up to 1929 (Pedler, 1974, p. 246). The 
Obaseki had two Para plantations, of 10,000 and 12,000 trees, 4 to 6 years old in 1919.54 
Before 1921, however, most of these must have been small. Chief Ugo had a single 
acre at Benin (Egboh, 1985, p. 159). Thompson described those planted in the Benin 
City District in 1906 as “small private plantations.”55 A 1917 return of Para plantations 
in Benin forwarded a list excluding those with less than 20 trees, and “small private 
plantations of which there is no record”. It listed 270 started in 1914 or 1915, with 57 
seedlings planted on average. These faced their own difficulties. Cowan told the WALC 
that there were six African owned Para plantations of 10,000 to 30,000 trees in the 
Sapele district. They had been paying for labour by allowing workers to plant “catch 
crops” among the trees, and as a result, the rubber had suffered. In his view, they had 
“tried to make the thing pay as they went along, and they have been pennywise and 
pound foolish” (WALC, 1916, p 468-475). 
This was, by contrast, a period during which estates and smallholders in Asia 
successfully expanded production. Dumett (1971, p. 100) argues this was because 
Malayan rubber was “backed by European capital and scientific management,” while 
Para rubber had a higher coutchouc content and better wound response than Funtumia. 
Barlow (1978, p. 18), similarly, suggests that yields were much higher with Para than 
Funtumia, a concern more important for the communal plantations (discussed below). 
Clarence-Smith (2010), contrasting rubber’s success in Indonesia with its failure in the 
Congo, emphasizes that Sumatran smallholders solved many of the problems described 
above. They acquired seeds and knowledge from the larger estates, much like 
smallholders near Firestone’s plantations later on in Liberia. They also, like successful 
Benin planters later on, recruited the labour of migrant sharecroppers. Large planters 
stated that they had left the Congo for Asia because of inadequate transport facilities 
and labour supply.56  
The importance of labour supply is borne out other studies. Estates in Ceylon, Malaya 
and Sumatra were worked by immigrants from India and Java, while estates in Borneo 
and French Indo-China similarly relied on migrants (Bauer, 1948, p. 217). The 
government actively supported the immigration of Tamil and Chinese labourers; the 
former were used in tapping while the latter opened new land (Barlow, 1978, p. 43-
45,51). Chinese labourers also became smallholders, developing two to four hectare 
blocks while working in mines or estates (Barlow, 1978, p. 39). 
Other factors also gave Asia an edge. Land was more readily available to expatriates. 
The government in Malaya granted land to Chinese tapioca and gambier planters on the 
                                                          
53 Pedler (1974, p. 246) identified him as a Sierra Leonean who had previously been an agent for the RNC. 
54 NAI, Ben Prof 2/6 BP 480 19: Agricultural Department Report. 
55 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 17. 
56 By contrast, Cogneau (1992) studies the relative profitability of Para  in the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, 
Malaysia and Indonesia during the late 1980s. He finds that exchange rates explain much of the difference 
in margins within his sample. I do not believe this explanation is relevant to the period under study, as the 
British West African Pound was tied to the British pound. 
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condition they also plant rubber (Jackson, 1968, p. 228). Malay residents sold their 
ancestral lands to estate groups and other outside interests (Barlow, 1978, p. 39). The 
government also invested in extending the road and rail networks (Jackson, 1968, p. 
236). Barlow (1978, p. 27) lists political stability as an additional factor in Malaya’s 
favour. 
Benin’s success later on can also be partly explained by relaxation of the constraints 
identified above. Usuanlele (1988, p. 249-254) gives the most thorough explanation. He 
rejects Anschel’s (1965) view that rising prices after 1934 explain this, since cash needs 
were created by colonial tax demands. I add above that prices were not dramatically 
higher in this period. My concern with Usuanlele’s view here is its timing. Direct taxes 
introduced in 1916 were set at 2s per adult and 1s per youth in 1920, Female taxes 
were removed in 1927. Planting should have come earlier. More credible is his 
suggestion that land annexations by chiefs, urban residents, and forest reserves 
encouraged individuals to plant trees on fallow plots to claim them permanently. This 
was a general pattern in Southwestern Nigeria; across 112 clans, tribes or groups 1938, 
the correlation between the number of oil palm planters and the fraction of the area 
under forest reserves  is 0.416 (p<0.000).57 These pressures combined with influx of 
Igbo willing to work as share tappers. Overall, the scarcity labour relative to land was 
disappearing.   
 
4.3. Communal plantations. The colonial government established thousands of small 
plantations of mostly Funtumia rubber throughout Benin, owned by local communities. 
“Communal” is the government’s term. At first seen as promising, before the First World 
War it was clear they were in trouble. They suffered from labour scarcity, a lack of state 
resources, colonial difficulties in transferring skills and information, and low prices 
once Asian production took off. These difficulties, as I have shown above, contrast with 
the conditions that allowed Asian producers later Edo smallholders to succeed. 
 
4.3.1. Initial promise. The communal plantations were started early on. In 1899, 
nurseries were established in a few district centres, so that plantations could be made 
to close to the villages. These would be used for seed to sow in the bush at the beginning 
of the rainy season.58 Of 450 miles of road existing in the Benin territories, the Forestry 
Inspector planted 250 with rubber seed, four deep on each side.59 In 1900, twenty large 
nurseries were established in the Benin territories to supply seedlings.60 It was 
presumed the labour required for transplanting and caring for the young rubber would 
be performed “subject to the supervision of the Forestry Inspectors, by the inhabitants 
of those villages which [would] ultimately be enriched by the matured rubber.”61 All 
                                                          
57 The data used for this correlation are available on request, and are taken from Appendix Table 5 of 
Bridges, A.F.B. (1938) “Report on the Oil Palm Survey: Western Provinces”, in the A.F.B. Bridges Papers, 
stored at the Rhodes’ House Library, Oxford, under the call number Mss Afr s. 697. 
58 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1899-1900, p. 10. 
59 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1899-1900, p. 10. 
60 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1900, p. 14. 
61 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1900, p. 14. 
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villages receiving timber royalties were required to establish nurseries from 1901 
(Igbafe, 1979). 
Undergirding these efforts was paternalistic racism, made clear by Bedwell, the 
Acting Colonial Secretary, in 1903: 
 
It is not in the nature of the average West African to lay out capital for which 
there is no immediate return. He can understand the yam growing at his 
door; he can understand the cask of oil to be filled before his “boys” can 
return with the required cloth, pipe or frock-coat, but he will not sew for his 
son to reap; nor will a village work, of its own initiative, for the benefit of the 
next generation that is to occupy it. It is this difficulty that has rendered so 
great the task of encouraging the rubber industry.62 
 
The government distributed seeds and seedlings and oversaw tapping. The 
communal plantations were mostly Funtumia, but contained some Para. 63  By the end of 
1903, 145,000 plants had been established in 126 village plantations (Igbafe, 1979, 
p.343). There were 1,050 communal plantations in the Province in 1906, 1629 in 1907, 
and 2251 in 1908 (Egboh, 1985, p. 159). Similar efforts were made elsewhere in 
Southern Nigeria, though Benin was the model case.64 
These were initially seen as promising, and were encouraged by colonial officials. In 
1904, Egerton saw the boom in the rubber market and the development of trade as 
“gratifying,” and hoped improved methods would help prices eventually close on those 
paid for rubber from the Straits and Ceylon.65 Experiments were in progress to improve 
tapping.66 In 1905, Fosbery reported that rubber continued to show a “considerable 
increase,” predicting that “with systematic cultivation and collection it will become a 
valuable addition to the exports of the country.”67 In 1906, two pupils had just returned 
from the French School of Forestry in Mali.68 
In 1906, 368 plantations with 167,135 plants were made in the Benin Districts69 and 
916 plantations with 678,000 plants existed in the Central Province, in addition to 134 
plantations with 80,000 plants in what had earlier been the Central Division.70 In 1908, 
there were 2,251 Funtumia plantations in the Central Province, containing 1,125,972 
trees, many of which were old enough to be tapped.71 In the Benin City district that year 
                                                          
62 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1903, p. 19. 
63 Secondary sources offer contradictory evidence. Igbafe (1979, p. 347) refers to Funtumia, while 
Usuanlele (2003, p. 58) states that the first plantations were Para, with Funtumia and Ceara “introduced” 
only in 1908. In the annual reports it is clear that Funtumia was the predominant variety: see the Report 
on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 17, or the Southern Nigeria Annual Reports 
for 1907 (p. 11), 1908 (p. 15) or 1909 (p. 12). 
64 These are discussed in the Southern Nigeria Annual Reports for 1904 through 1911. 
65 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1904, p. 19. 
66 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1904, p. 24. 
67 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1905, p. 21. 
68 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 38. 
69 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906, p. 37. 
70 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 17. 
71 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908, p. 15. 
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154,000 trees were added to the communal plantations.72 In 1910, the success of the 
communal plantations in Benin inspired 24 villages in the Ilesha District and some 
communities in Ijebu-Ode and Epe to start plantations.73 In 1911, 224 new villages were 
planted out in 63,753 Funtumia seedlings, and 4,133 Para plants were put out under the 
same scheme. In 1912, “numerous communal rubber plantations were examined” in the 
Central Province, with arrangements made for extending them.74 
In 1910, several thousand communal Funtumia plantations had become large enough 
to tap.75 Tapping and rubber preparation were done under the supervision of the Forest 
Department, and in the presence of the owners. To coagulate the latex, the rubber was 
boiled, and then rolled into thin biscuits using a wooden roller on a table. The rubber 
was washed with hot water. These biscuits were then hung for drying and smoked in a 
long drying shed. The amber-coloured biscuits were reported to be of “the first quality,” 
produced “by means of simple appliances that can easily be procured by the natives,” 
and were sold for 6s 6d per lb despite a falling market.76 This was seen as a “very great 
improvement on the usual quality of rubber exported from Southern Nigeria.” In 1911, 
the Chief Conservator of Forests inspected several of the communal plantations, which 
he thought were “very fine examples of their kind and should eventually form valuable 
native estates.”77 
4706 trees from 84 plantations were tapped in the Benin City district in 1910, 20,210 
trees from 300 plantations in 1911, and 386 plantations were tapped in 1913.78 The 
yield for 1911 was 1,885 lbs and 11 oz of dry rubber.79 In 1912, 2,988 lbs of “good 
rubber” were sold locally at 3s 4d per lb, and 43 lbs of “tackey rubber” was sold for 2s 
10d. Two thirds of these revenues were paid to the communities and chiefs.80 In 1913, 
5,612 lbs of rubber were exported from the communal plantations.81 Tapping during 
1913 was overseen by “native staff” of the Forest Department, along with Ogas 
(headmen), who supervised groups of ten to twenty villagers.82 The staff encompassed 
the Assistant Conservator of Forests, an interpreter, a forester, ten Forest Guards, five 
pupils, and five Ogas.83 In 1914, certificates were issued so that each village had one 
certified headman, “responsible for the upkeep and cleaning of his plantation.”84 
 
4.3.2. Problems. Outside observers were impressed with these plantations; Christy 
(1911) reported that “[t]he system of native communal plantations so successful in 
                                                          
72 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1909, p. 12. 
73 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1910, p. 12. 
74 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1912, p. 9. 
75 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1910, p. 14.  
76 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1910, p. 14.  
77 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1911, p. 9. 
78 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1911, p. 13. NAI Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the 
Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
79 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1911, p. 13. 
80 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1912, p. 14. 
81 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
82 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
83 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
84 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
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Southern Nigeria is admirable, and should be adopted by all the west African colonies.” 
Several problems were, however, already apparent. One of the most notable difficulties 
they faced was labour scarcity. Usuanlele (1988, p. 6, 224) has made this argument for 
Benin in general and the communal plantations in particular. The population density of 
Benin was estimated at only 25 per sqm in 1927.85 I begin by adding more evidence in 
favour of this view.86 
Labour scarcity was apparent as early as 1901. That year, the Annual Report for 
Southern Nigeria noted that recent “changes in the social conditions of the natives of 
these territories, particularly with regard to slavery, render it certain that the capacity 
of these native carriers for their transport work is not likely to increase, at all events for 
some years to come, until a good native labour market is established.”87 The colonial 
response was to enact the House Rule Ordinance. This was initially intended to maintain 
reciprocal obligations between House heads and members in the Niger Delta; in its 
actual application, however, the Ordinance made it easier for the state to rely on Benin 
chiefs to requisition labour, since the law enabled them to bring those who refused 
work before the Native Court (Igbafe, 1975). In 1906, similarly, the Provincial Forest 
Officer reported that the Isoko and Urhobo were too involved in road-making to devote 
much time to plantations; where rubber had been taken up, palm oil had been 
abandoned.88 
As with other colonial projects, the gains were unequally distributed and it was 
expected the plantations would be worked with unpaid labour. Without pay, it became 
difficult to recruit workers. The 1913 Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations 
detailed five major problems that were causing them to fail: first, the weakened 
authority of the local chiefs; second, competing labour demand from other sectors, such 
as timber areas, government works, road construction, and porterage; third, insufficient 
incentives for the local communities, even when the government waived its one third 
claim to the plantations’ revenue in that year; fourth, villagers’ lack of experience with 
the product, which was made worse by deferred payoff of rubber as a tree crop, and; 
fifth, sharp labour demands that conflicted with seasonal festivals and funerals.89 
Tapping had to be done during the rainy season, when villagers preferred to do farm 
work and rebuild their homes.90 Results on the model plantations, similarly, could only 
be achieved by “constantly worrying” the Obaseki and Edosomah for labour.91 
                                                          
85 NAI, CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin Division. 
86Usuanlele (2009) updates the arguments from Usuanlele (1988) and Usuanlele (2003) on the 
communal plantations, though I have yet been unable to obtain a copy of this paper. 
87 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1901, p. 8. 
88 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906., p. 17. 
89 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
Compounding this was the uncompromising scheduling of the Forestry Department. The report’s author 
wrote that villagers objected “to the pressure at which we have to make them work in order to get 
through the large number of scattered plantations in the season and usually would like use to wait some 
convenient time between their festivals and funerals for our visit.”  
90 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
91 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
Similarly, the state withheld royalties from Chiefs Eso, Oshodi and Obaseki in 1915 for failing to weed 
their plantations (Usuanlele, 1988, p. 222). 
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The next year, the report on the communal plantations noted that it was difficult 
getting upkeep work done: 
 
The village people have shown very plainly that they do not care for the 
plantations. The Forest guards report that they have the greatest difficulty in 
getting any cleaning or clearing done. At Uburu Uku the forest Guards had 
been driven away when they attempted to get the plantations cleaned. ... At 
Ogwashi Uku and Abah very few men would be persuaded to do the work 
which was done almost entirely by the Forest Guards.92 
 
Similarly, in Ishan, the people were disinclined to do the work requested, and officials 
felt they had been wasting their time. Especially in Asaba, Ifon and Ishan, officials had 
difficulty getting men to work. Many chiefs complained that, “as their power had been 
broken, it was hardly fair to make them responsible for the boys not working.”93 In 
addition to the work of tapping and upkeep, processing was labour intensive. Latex had 
to be cooked at central cooking camps and let stand for eighteen hours or more before it 
was ready to cook. For people from outlying villages, this was not worth the time 
involved, and they would not stay behind to learn how to properly cook the rubber.94 
Officials recognized that their own labour requisitioning contributed to this scarcity of 
labour – the same report noted that the question of carriers “has been a difficult one. 
The Assistant Conservator of Forests is obliged to find his own carriers, except on 
leaving a station, to take him from village to village. These carriers are not paid and this 
does not help to make the rubber business any more popular.” In 1916, the Resident 
pointed out that it was not worthwhile for villages to send small quantities of rubber to 
Benin, and that they did not do so voluntarily.95 
This was not the only difficulty faced by the plantations. While the proceeds of the 
plantations were supposedly to be split between the government and the local 
communities, their benefits went largely to the chiefs. This was true also of the model 
Para plantation on the road between Benin City and Sapele, which was owned by 
eighteen Benin City chiefs who had “provided the labour for it free.”96 Lugard, similarly, 
believed that “communal” labour meant “forced” labour, and opposed the plantations on 
these grounds (Egboh, 1985, p. 160). In 1924, the Resident chastised the Oba, 
requesting the District Officer to inform him that if his workers were “called upon to 
work for nothing, it simply means that they will leave their villages, and either seek 
employment with the timber concessionaires or elsewhere outside the division.”97 
Bradbury (1973) notes that chiefs received one third of the wages paid for labourers 
                                                          
92 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
93 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
94 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
95 NAI, Ben Prof 2/3 BP 523 1916: Proceeds from Rubber Sales; no date given, letter to Secretary, 
Southern Provinces. 
96 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
97 NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division. 18 Feb, 1924: Resident to District Officer. 
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they requisitioned, and a share of the profits from rubber. Some were still profiting from 
these as late as 1960, though this hurt their legitimacy.  
A plantation established by the Forestry Department near Usonigbe had been turned 
over to the local villages around 1910, but in 1914 was appropriated by the Oba. His 
successor was leasing it to Palmer for tapping in 1937.98 A Para plantation on Sapele 
Road that had been damaged by fire was turned over to the Iyashere in 1916, since he 
was the only chief who had shown interest in it.99 One official remarked that “looking at 
it from a business profit and loss point of view the communal plantations have so far 
been a failure, except to the chiefs.”100 Not all revenues failed to produce public benefits, 
however; the Native Council in Benin used some of its share of rubber revenues to 
finance the city’s waterworks (WALC, 1916, p. 393). 
In addition, the colonial state was short on staff and equipment. The supply of seed 
was not always reliable; seeds imported from Cameroon failed to germinate, while and 
poor germination had lowered the number of Funtumia planted in Southern Nigeria 
from 234,878 in 1907 to 133,094 in 1908. Of the 622 plantations formed during that 
year, most were extensions to existing ones.101 In 1910, the Agricultural and Forestry 
departments were separated, and von Hellermann (2005, p. 112) argues that the 
Forestry Department quickly lost interest in agricultural pursuits. Before 1911, thinning 
had been neglected, and the trees needed each other’s support to stand.102 At Agbor and 
Asaba, while thinning was desperately needed, there was no staff to do the work. The 
report for 1913 admitted neglect by the government, stating that “it is a breach of good 
faith and fair dealing to have started these rubber plantations as a native industry and 
leave them, now when maturing and needing thinning, tapping etc under European 
supervision.”103 
The District Officer worried that the villages were “disappointed with the results of 
their labour.”104 In Ishan in 1913, the Forestry Department was “unable” to tap the 93 
communal plantations.105 At times, one Forest Guard and one pupil had to supervise 
twenty men.106 That year, the senior Conservator of Forests suspended tapping “on the 
ground that the trees need rest, and the Forestry Department is short of officers.”107 In 
1917, there were no funds to supervise preparation and assist in the sale of rubber at 
Ubiaja.108 
                                                          
98 NAI, Ben Dist 1 BD 84 Vol 2: Usonigbe Native Court and District Affairs: 16 March, 1937: Palmer to DO; 
handwritten note by Jull. 
99 NAI, Ben Prof 2/5 BP 173/1916 Communal Rubber PlantationManagement of. 9Nov, 1916: Conservator 
of Forests Benin Circle to Resident Benin Province. 
100 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
101 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1908, p. 15. 
102 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
103 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
104 NAI, BP 138 1914: Annual Reports Benin Province. 
105 NAI, BP 138 1914: Annual Reports Benin Province. 
106 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
107 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
108 AI, Ben Prof 2/4: BP 403 17: Village Rubber Plantation, 3 July, 1917: District OfficerUbiaja to Resident, 
Benin and 9 Aug, 1917: Resident to Distirct Officer Ubiaja. 
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In 1917, the government had to borrow pans, metal spoons, tapping knives, rollers, 
cog wheels, fittings, and bottles of acetic acid from Miller Brothers.109 Local tapping 
knives were “slow and bad,” though by 1914 a local “native imitation” of Para knives 
had been devised.110 Smoking facilities were inadequate, and could not prevent the 
cured rubber from becoming mouldy.111 The two smoking sheds at Benin City were 
poorly built, lacked proper heating and drying facilities, and were in constant danger of 
catching fire.112 
It was also difficult for the colonial government to transmit new knowledge and skills 
related to plantation management, tapping methods, and output quality. Much plant 
distribution had to be done from the Onitsha Gardens. As early as 1906, it was 
recognized that this was a poor location relative to the Central Province. It was too dry 
and too far from the centres in which cocoa and Para rubber could be successfully 
cultivated.113 Para yields were estimated to be five times greater than those for 
Funtumia per acre, but there were only 6,000 acres in Southern Nigeria by 1922 (Egboh, 
1985, p. 162). One officer reported in 1913 that the “native idea of a clean plantation is 
often opposed to all Forest ideas of soil protection and the arrival of a Forest Officer 
often leads to the plantation being swept and scraped bare of all needful and protecting 
surface soil and humus.”114 Individual rubber samples mentioned in colonial 
correspondence were often poor – in 1918 samples of locally grown rubber were 
reported to be “anything but good, and it is evident if the best results are to be obtained, 
that the Beni ‘Planter’ requires both advice and supervision.”115 
The quality of Nigerian rubber, among the worst in the world after the Second World 
War (Anschel, 1965), was an issue for wild and plantation rubber. In 1906, it was 
reported that “up to the present practically the whole of the rubber exported is forest 
produce, rudely prepared by the native with little or no intelligent control of the 
collection.”116 At that time, most Funtumia was shipped as either “Lagos lump” or 
“Benin lump,” containing a very large percentage of water and impurities.”117 Efforts 
were made to replace these lumps with biscuits, which were easier to dry and better 
resisted rotting. Generally, heat, lime juice, or an infusion of costus lucanusianus was 
used as a coagulant. In addition, inferior latex from a variety of other plants was used to 
adulterate the latex.118 
While I have found no direct evidence from Benin, the experience of the Lagos 
hinterland suggests that improving quality was not worthwhile for producers. While 
                                                          
109 NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division. 
110 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
111 NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 270 1917: Sale of Village Rubber Plantation, 28 March, 1917: District Officer to 
Resident. 
112 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
113 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906, p. 41. 
114 NAI, Ben Prof 2/1 BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 (1913). 
115 NAI, Ben Prof 2/4 BP 262 1917: Para Rubber, Benin Division. 12 Dec, 1917: Herald toWatt. 
116 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906, p. 31. 
117 Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria for 1906, p. 35. 
118 Thompson listed carpodinus hirsuta and carpodinius fulvis (funtumia africana, hoarrhena wulfsbergii, 
alstonia confensis, omphalocarpum elatum, couonopharyngia pachysiphon, omphalogonum calophyllum) 
as adulterants. 
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rubber produced in French West Africa using chemicals available from local plants 
fetched 54d per lb in Europe, “Lagos lump” could was only valued at 18d to 24d per lb 
Egboh (1985, p. 166). In 1907, Thomspon reported that “with one exception, the 
European firms trading in this produce have not encouraged the movement to the 
extent they might have done by paying substantially better prices for the improved 
article.”119 Similarly, in 1909, another official complained that, while all licensees and 
Ogas were instructed in the “proper method” of making rubber, the Yorubas “simply 
refuse to do it, as they can sell bad rubber near Illushi even if not at Siluko or Benin 
City.”120 Though an ordinance to control the adulteration of produce had been passed 
the previous year, Miller Brothers complained that the amount of rubber then fell; 
Unwin’s view was that “the natives, especially Yorubas just tried to see how long the 
firms would hold out before giving way, after two months the whole thing was reversed 
and they were told that they could make lump rubber.” A “vacillating policy” from Miller 
Brothers and indifference from the other European firms made it difficult to convince 
Africans that quality biscuits, as opposed to lumps, were actually wanted. 
In 1908, experiments were conducted to improve the quality of Nigerian rubber.121 
Straining the latex for impurities, washing it once it was freshly coagulated, and cutting 
it into thin strips that could be more easily dried in wood smoke created a product that 
could be sold in England for between 4s 6d and 4s 8d a lb, when Brazilian Para could 
fetch a price of 5s 2d.122 This was achieved using simple articles that it was hoped could 
be obtained by Africans – demijohns, earthen pots, a sieve, empty bottles, and the like. 
These were demonstrated to the rangers, forester, forest guards and pupils in the hope 
that they would pass these methods onto others. F.S. James, the Colonial Secretary, 
optimistically assumed the price of Nigerian rubber could be doubled by such efforts, so 
long as these higher prices could be passed onto producers and adulteration policed.123 
Two African Rangers were sent to French West Africa, and returned in 1907 on a 
lecture tour that did encourage some quality biscuit production in Benin, but only 35.5 
lbs were actually offered for sale (Egboh, 1985, p. 166-7). Biscuits took twice as long to 
produce and lost weight more rapidly than lump rubber; one official estimated that it 
would require 4s per lb to induce producers to switch (ibid.). The Adulteration of 
Produce Ordinance of 1897 was used between 1907 to 1909 to prevent producers from 
producing lump rubber, but this was quickly withdrawn due to protests from European 
firms who faced declining supplies. In 1908 it was reported that attempts to improve 
the quality of rubber had been “rendered futile, owing, principally, to the unwillingness 
of the merchants to pay for the inspection and supervision of the rubber tappers and to 
the reluctance of the Government to follow the lead of neighbouring Governments and 
prohibit the sale or export of lump rubber.”124 In 1909, the government proposed 
charging local firms a fee of 1 or 2d per lb to mount an instruction campaign, but this 
                                                          
119 NAUK, CO520/50:30 Nov, 1907: Rubber Collection (Egerton to Elgin). 
120 NAUK, CO 520/83, Enc. 25 Sept, 1909: Unwin to Thompson. 
121 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906, p. 39. 
122 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906, p. 39. 
123 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1906, p. 39. 
124 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1909, p. 13. 
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was withdrawn following opposition from the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce (Egboh, 
1985, p. 168). In 1913, however, there was a falling off in exports “owing to the very 
poor prices offered for the low grade of rubber shipped”.125 That year, prices for Ishan 
rubber were said to be low due to “its inferior quality and large percentage of 
impurities; also owing to the large quantities of good plantation rubber now on the 
market.”126 The quality of Nigerian rubber did not improve – one 1918 textbook 
described “Benin ball” as “generally dirty,” having “rotten, woody smell” (Pearson, 
1918). 
Finally, the return to rubber fell sharply once Asian production began to increase. 
While initially proposed as a year-to-year arrangement, the waiving of the government’s 
share of the revenues from the communal plantations soon became permanent.127 
Officials realized that the failure to anticipate the collapse of the world market was a 
major oversight on their part; the 1914 report on the communal plantations noted that: 
 
The possibility, in fact probability of a fall in the price of rubber was evidently 
not taken into consideration when these operations were started...A second 
and very important point is that the natives have not taken up the plantations 
with much enthusiasm. Every year the returns have been smaller and, most 
important of all, the natives have been kept waiting many months before 
receiving payment.128 
 
This echoed the similar failure of British planters in East Africa to forecast the 
magnitude of the impact that Asian production would have on world prices (Munro, 
1983, p. 373). 
The government admitted failure. The same report recommended turning the 
plantations over to the local villages, noting that it would not be remunerative to work 
them with paid labour. In 1916, the Forestry Department ceased to exercise any control 
over the communal plantations, and the commissioner of the Benin Province requested 
the District Officer to inform the “native owners” that, since the government “has given 
them practical instruction in the method of planting, tapping, and preparing the rubber 
in those plantations, it is now their duty to carry on the work themselves without 
regular supervision and assistance.”129 Proceeds were then divided between the Native 
Authority and the villages.130 In 1918, the District Officer for Benin asked the Resident 
about his meeting with the local agent for Miller Brothers, concerning the continued 
purchase of rubber. “If there is no market for the Native Administration Rubber,” he 
                                                          
125 Southern Nigeria Annual Report for 1913, p. 15. 
126 NAI, BP 138 1914: Annual Reports Benin Province. 
127 NAI, BP 76 1914: Communal Plantations Central Province; 16 Dec, 1913: Colonial Secretary to 
Conservator of Forests. 
128 NAI, BP 5 1915: Report on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914. 
129 NAI, Ben Prof 2/5 BP 173/1916 Communal Rubber Plantation Management of, 2 March, 1916: 
Commissioner Benin Province to District Officer. 
130 See, e.g. NAI, Ben Prof 2/3 BP 523 1916: Proceeds from Rubber Sales. 
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warned “tapping should cease temporarily and the trees be allowed to rest.”131 The 
export market had collapsed. It was then “impossible to import rubber into the United 
Kingdom.” Miller Brothers were unable to ship rubber from Sapele to Great Britain. He 
sighed: 
 
It appears that rubber will not keep in this country, and unless a market can 
be found for the rubber products of the communal rubber plantations and the 
para plantations, it would appear to be a waste of both time and money to 
continue tapping and preparing rubber, as is now being done by the Native 
Administration (ibid). 
 
In 1921, the Director of Agriculture wrote his above-quoted memorandum 
abandoning rubber. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This was not the end for the rubber industry in Benin. After 1935, planting took off 
and exports began to grow. The British supported both plantation and wild rubber 
during the war, but were ambivalent to its future prospects. Their concerns 
notwithstanding, Benin’s rubber exports continued to rise through independence, 
peaking in the 1970s. 
In this paper I have argued that problems of institutions, information, and inequality 
delay rubber’s development. The British could not replace existing property rights with 
institutions that encouraged preservation of natural resources. The colonial state lacked 
the ability to adequately enforce property rights, supervise operations on the communal 
plantations, or provide the staff and equipment needed. 
The British could not forecast the world market and plan accordingly, nor were they 
effectively able to pass new skills onto Nigerians. Neither expatriate firms nor Nigerians 
had the information needed to predict prices or profits with reasonable security. 
Information problems made policing the production of wild rubber nearly impossible.  
Officials expected the bulk of the necessary work to come from those who stood to 
benefit the least. The bulk of the returns on the communal plantations went to the 
chiefs, and not the villagers who worked them. It should not be surprising, then, that the 
Nigerian rubber industry was so slow to grow. 
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APPENDIX 
 
In this section I argue that the data do not permit a credible quantitative exercise to 
tease out the relative importance of the various problems faced by rubber plantations in 
Benin.  
 
A back of the envelope calculation. I begin with a simple calculation that attempts to 
answer the question “were labour costs enough to explain the difficulties faced by 
rubber in Benin?” Supposing a producer price of  , a wage of  , and a per-pound labour 
input of  , rubber is profitable if      0. Were wages too high relative to the price? 
What, then, are  ,  , and  ? The colonial annual reports give annual prices per lb 
ranging from 12d to 78d before Asian production came online, with a range of 24d to 
36d being most common (see below). It is difficult to know what fraction of this went to 
producers, but comparable evidence from the Gold Coast and the government’s 
payment of 2/3 of the proceeds to the communal plantations suggests 1/2 to 2/3 as a 
reasonable guide. For wages, Frankema and van Waijenburg (2010) estimate nominal 
unskilled wages of 6-15d in Lagos during the period, which are similar to estimates in 
the annual reports.  Usuanlele (1988, p.241), similarly, claims timber firms paid 9d a 
day in 1906. It is, of course, unclear what these wages mean in an environment where 
coerced labour exists. For  , Usuanlele (1988, p. 257) provides a lower bound, claiming 
tappers on European plantations during the 1940s produced 2 lbs daily. Since 
sharecroppers often received one half of the gross output later in the colonial period, a 
reasonable upper bound on the labour needed for processing is twice this. 
Together, these suggest optimistic, pessimistic, and agnostic estimates of rubber’s 
profitability (in d/lb): 
                    
 Optimistic  26  6  0.5  23 
 Pessimistic  12  15  1  -3 
 Agnostic  19  10  0.75  11.5 
 
Even taking a very simple calculation and using plausible values of a small set of 
parameters, it is possible to derive very different answers.  
 
A simulation exercise. Another approach is to use cost-benefit analysis to piece together 
a reasonable distribution for the internal rate of return (IRR) of a one-acre rubber 
plantation. I assume constant returns to scale. Suppose the fixed cost of establishing a 
Funtumia plantation in the first year is  . Suppose further that, from maturity in year  
until the end of its lifespan  , the plantation yields an operating profit of  . The 
plantation's net present value (   ) will be: 
 
         
 
   
 
 
      . 
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The IRR will be the value of   such that the     is zero. I break   and   into their 
components, and represent these as functions of parameters that can be obtained from 
primary sources. I assume distributions on these parameters, and simulate 3000 draws 
of the IRR. I assume that, while land is free, establishment costs come from the labour 
required to clear and plant it: 
 
                                    
 (                                             )       
 ( 1   2)    
  
Operating profits are revenues minus the annual cost of tapping, plantation 
maintenance or upkeep, and processing: 
 
                                                            
                                              
 
                                   
                
 
                           
 (1                   )
 (                                                         ) 
       
   1   
 
  2    (1   )  (     3   ) 
 
Rather than accounting for capital and depreciation, I assume capital (such as smoking 
facilities) adds a premium above the labour cost of processing. Below, I report the 
distributions assumed for each of the thirteen parameters needed to produce these 
estimates. These are based on scattered observations from archival and other sources, 
detailed below. I assume no general equilibrium effects. Because the IRR evaluates a 
single project, I do not need to consider the rate of return to alternate projects. 
 
Parameters 
 
     Years to maturity    U[5,10] 
    Lifespan of plantation    U[20,30] 
    Trees per acre     U[1000,2000] 
   Annual yield per tree in lbs  U[0.5,1.5]  
 1    Days clearing per acre   U[50,150]  
 2    Days planting per acre    U[25,75]  
    Trees per tapper     U[100,200]  
 1  Days per tapper     U[100,200] 
 2  Days annual upkeep    U[10,30] 
 3  Days processing per lb    U[0.1,0.7] 
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   Capital multiplier     U[0.5,1.5] 
   Producer price in d per lb    U[10,50] 
   Wage in pence per man-day   U[6,15]  
 
The results are given in the figure below. Despite optimistic price assumptions, 
operating profits are negative in roughly 26% of simulations. The average of the non-
zero IRR realizations, however, is fairly high, at roughly 63%. At the median of the 
parameters, it is just under 48%. While establishment costs were low, year-to-year 
revenues were very uncertain. 
 
 
Establishment costs are small on average, running a little under £ 7. The main difficulty 
is that the mean revenue of slightly more than £185 is eaten up by variable costs. On 
average, tapping takes up 48% of total revenue. This is close to the one half share paid 
to itinerant tappers during the 1960s. Annual upkeep accounts for less than 1% of 
revenue in a typical year. The fatal expense is processing; this eats up an additional 33% 
of revenue on average. This is, however, the component of production costs about which 
data is poorest. Again, the calculation is only as precise as the underlying data. 
 
Sources of parameter estimates. I abbreviate Southern Nigeria Annual Report as SNAR, 
Report on the Forest Administration of Southern Nigeria as RFASN, BP 5 1915: Report 
on the Tapping Operations on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 as BP5/1915, 
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and BP 364 1914: Report on the Communal Rubber Plantations for 1914 as 
BP364/1914. 
  (Years to maturity): That the communal plantations were first tapped in 1910 
suggests they took roughly 7 years to mature. Christy (1911, p. 96) states that Funtumia 
will give a fair yield in its sixth year.  
  (Lifespan of plantation): I have no observations, so I assume 30 as a reasonable 
guess. For Para, Anschel (1965, p. 145) assumes tapping starts in the sixth year and 
continues for 24 more years. 
  (Trees per acre): Christy (1911, p. 108); Funtumia in Benin City plantations was 
planted 4 to 6 ft apart, implying roughly 1750 per acre. He also notes (p. 97) that 3 or 4 
times as many Funtumia can be planted per acre as Para. Blanckenburg (1963) reported 
average Para densities of 300 to 500 per acre (trees planted on average 9 to 15 ft apart). 
Igbafe (1979, p. 346) states that there were 256 plantations containing 142,978 trees 
and covering 118 acres (1212 trees per acre) in 1907. 
  (Annual yield per tree in lbs): RFASN 1906; 2 to 3 oz per tree per tapping. SNAR 
1910; 1.402 oz per tapping for trees over 18 inches. SNAR 1911; 1.59 oz per tree. Bell 
(1907); 1 lb of tree per year expected from Funtumia in Uganda. Blanckenburg (1963) 
states that “low yielding local varieties” give 200-400 lbs of dry rubber per acre per 
year, while “improved varieties” give up to 1200 lbs. He quotes the Ministry of 
Agriculture's estimate of 200 lbs per acre, and believes in his study villages it is closer to 
300. At 400 trees per acre, this is between 0.5 and 3 lbs annually for Para, which had 
better yields than Funtumia. Christy (1911, p. 181-187) gives results from tapping on 
several Kamerun plantations, but does not clearly state whether the results are for a 
single tapping, or annual; in the one instance where he gives an annual figure (p. 186), 
he suggests that between 2 and 6 oz per year (.125-.375 lb) is possible per year for 
excision tapping, incision tapping (p. 189) gave 1 lb of dry rubber over twelve months. 
His own summary (p. 193) suggests that in years 6 through 10, a Funtumia tree will 
give 4, 5, 9, 12 and 15 oz of dry rubber per year (.25-.94 lb). BP5/1915 gives yields in 
Benin, Ifon and Ishan that correspond to 0.06, 0.05, and 0.08 lbs per tree, respectively. 
BP364/1914 gives yield figures per tree tapped of 1 to 1.6 lb. Egboh (1985, p. 162) 
suggests that Funtumia yields were generally 60 lbs per acre (0.04 lbs per tree if 1500 
trees), as opposed to more than 300 for Para. 
 1 (Days clearing per acre): Forde, Scott and Perham (1946) estimate that clearing in 
ecologically-similar Yorubaland takes 42 to 98 man-days per acre. For Benin, they do 
not give man-day estimates; clearing, seed, and weeding together on a 4.35 acre cocoa 
farm cost £12/7/6 over 3 years. On a 5 acre farm in Benin, the total costs of clearing 
were £10. These suggest clearing costs of £2 to 3 per acre, which at 9d per day suggests 
55 to 80 man-days in clearing. 
 2 (Days planting per acre): Anschel (1965, p. 143) reports 36.4 man-days per acre 
“for establishment” of Para. This seems low if it does not include clearing, so I take it as 
a measure of planting time. 
  (Trees per tapper): Usuanlele (1988, p. 257); during the Second World War a 
tapper could produce 2 pounds of rubber daily. Weinstein (1983, p. 17); Amazon 
RUBBER IN BENIN, 1897-1921 
34 
 
tappers tapped 100 to 200 trees daily. For Para, Anschel (1965, p. 240) reports an 
average of 271 trees per tapper. Blanckenburg (1963) states that a tapper producing 
lumps from Para can tap 600 trees per day, but only 450 when tapping for sheets. 
 1 (Days per tapper): For Para, Anschel (1965, p. 145) reports that one tapper will 
tap 2 acres a day 150 days per year. BP5/1915 stated expenses to the “native 
communities” of £ 258 for wood, carriers and plantation labour for 37,375 trees. 
 2 (Days annual upkeep) Anschel (1965, p. 143) reports 10.5 man-days of weeding 
per acre per year for Para. Blanckenburg (1963) states that an FAO team estimates 60 
man-days of labour are needed per acre of Para; it is not explicitly stated whether this 
includes tapping as well. If it does, it seems low.  
 3 (Days processing per lb) SNAR 1911; experiments in the Mamu reserve cost 8.25 
d per lb of dry rubber, for both tapping and preparation; if half of this is preparation and 
the wage is about 9d, this suggests half a day of preparation per lb. SNAR 1912; similar 
experiments cost 3.98 d per lb “apart from cost of supervision, harvesting, and 
preparation.” Blanckenburg (1963) estimated 2d per lb as processing costs to produce 
better rubber during the 1960s (which exactly offsets the increase in price). BP5/1915 
stated expenses to the government and forest department of roughly £435 for staff, 
carriers, “rubber shed boys,” tapping implements, and shed depreciation for 37,375 
trees, or 2.8 d per tree (or per lb if the yield is 1 lb). See also the discussion for . 
  (Capital multiplier): For Para, Anschel (1965, p. 243) reports that a mature 
plantation bringing in £277 in gross revenue will face costs of “tapping, collecting and 
processing” equal to £36.3 along with depreciation equal to £37.9 if rubber is inter-
planted and £61.3 if it is planted alone. The costs of “tapping, collecting, and processing” 
are exclusive of the one half share paid to tappers, so this suggests the cost of 
depreciation was 102% to 168% the cost of “collecting and processing.” He reports an 
average wage per day of 4.75s (p. 81), suggesting 158 man-days per acre. Since he also 
assumes (p.104) 404 lbs per acre of rubber, this suggests 0.38 man-days are needed for 
processing one lb of Para.  
  (Producer price in d per lb): SNAR 1908; 1s 6d per lb (18d per lb) for Benin lump, 
when comparable Para was selling for 41.5d per lb. Other Benin City samples were 
valued from 32d to 44d per lb when comparable Para was selling for 54d per lb and 
Benin lump was selling for 24d per lb. SNAR 1910; 6s 6d per lb (78d per lb), for rubber 
much better than what was normally exported. SNAR 1911; 3s 8.75d per lb (44.75d per 
lb) when the price of the best Para was 4s 6d (54d). The report also suggests a price of 
1s 6d per lb (18d per lb). Anschel (1965) reports export prices that average £153 per 
ton from 1900 to 1921, or 16.39d per lb. SNAR 1912, 3s 4d per lb (40d per lb) of which 
2/3 went to the producers and 1/3 to the government. Dumett (1971, p. 89) states that 
during the Gold Coast rubber boom, rubber sold for £4-5 per 60 lbs, of which producers 
received £2, or 8d per lb. Blanckenburg (1963) reports that in April 1962 farmers 
received 1s per lb of dry un-smoked rubber (generally grade B2), and 1s 2d for rubber 
processed and smoked in the cooperative station. Bata paid 13.75d per lb of B2 to its 
suppliers at that time; it paid 17d for RSS1, when the London price was 23.75d; this 
suggests farmers received about 62% of the London price. He thus estimates that 300 
JAMES FENSKE 
 
35 
 
lbs per acre yields £15, half of which goes to the tapper. BP5/1915 states that, netting 
out freight and other charges, rubber was sold for 16d per lb, and that Miller offered 
21d per lb in Benin City.  Egboh (1985, p. 167) gives a price of 12d to 15d per lb of 
Benin lump in 1907. He (p. 176) states that the “purchase price” of rubber rose from 
12d per lb in 1909 to 42d in 1910. CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin Division; 
most rubber from plantations around Benin City during the late 1920s was bought by 
James Thomas of Sapele for 1s per lb. BP 209 1914 - Forestry Report for 1913; 1s per lb 
for “Benin lump” in 1913. 
  (Wage in pence per day): SNAR 1899/1900; 9d to 1s (12d) per day. SNAR 1907; 
the cost of a “native labourer” never exceeds 3d a day, while unskilled labour varies 
from 6d to 1s per day. Frankema and van Waijenburg (2010) use colonial Blue Books to 
show that praedial wages in Lagos and the surrounding rural areas ranged from 6d to 
15d in the period 1900 to 1915; they have confirmed these figures with me in personal 
communication. CSO 26 09125 Assessment Report on Benin Division; in 1927 casual 
labour was paid £1 per month (roughly 9d per day with 6 day weeks), and labourers 
made extra money in their spare time. Ben Prof 8/1/2 Civil Judgment Book 1909-1911; 
a 1911 contract from Bey and Zimmer stipulated 15s per month plus 4s subsistence per 
week for labourers (about 15d per day). 
 
